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Abstract
Contingency and accident are two important notions in philosophy and philo-
sophical logic. Their meanings are so close that they are mixed sometimes, in both
everyday discourse and academic research. This indicates that it is necessary to
study them in a unified framework. However, there has been no logical research
on them together. In this paper, we propose a language of a bimodal logic with
these two concepts, investigate its model-theoretical properties such as expressiv-
ity and frame definability. We axiomatize this logic over various classes of frames,
whose completeness proofs are shown with the help of a crucial schema. The inter-
actions between contingency and accident can sharpen our understanding of both
notions. Then we extend the logic to a dynamic case: public announcements. By
finding the required reduction axioms, we obtain a complete axiomatization, which
gives us a good application to Moore sentences.
Keywords: contingency, accident, axiomatizations, expressivity, frame definability,
Moore sentences
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a bunch of investigations on non-normal modalities, such
as contingency/non-contingency, essence/accident. To say a formula is contingent,
if it is possibly true and also possibly false; to say a formula is accidental, if it is
true but possibly false. Contingency applies to propositions which have no exact truth
value; for example, “P=NP”, which is possibly true and possibly false. In contrast,
accident applies to propositions that are true but possibly false; for example, “John
won the prize” or “He is in China”. Despite being definable with other modalities
such as necessity, these two modalities formalize various important metaphysical and
epistemological notions in their own rights.
∗This research is supported by the youth project 17CZX053 of National Social Science Fundation of
China.
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The notion of contingency dates back to Aristotle, who develops a logic of state-
ments about contingency [3]. The logical research about this notion is initiated by
Montgomery and Routley [19], followed by Cresswell [4], Humberstone [16], Kuhn [17],
Zolin [29], and Fan, Wang and van Ditmarsch [7]. This notion has many analogues in
various setting; for example, it corresponds to borderline in a sorites setting, to un-
decidability in a proof-theoretic setting, to moral indifference in a deontic setting, to
agnosticism in a doxastic setting, and to ignorance in an epistemic setting, etc..1 This
means that the technical results on contingency also apply to those analogues. As for a
recent study of contingency, we refer to [8].
As a variation of contingency, the notion of accident, or ‘accidental truths’, goes
back at least to Leibniz, in disguise of the term ‘ve´rite´s de fait’ (factual truths) (cf.
e.g. [1,13]). This notion is used to reconstruct Go¨del’s ontological argument (e.g. [21]),
and relevant to the future contingents problem formalized by a negative form of acci-
dent [2], and to provide an additional partial verification of the Boxdot Conjecture
posed in [11] (see [24]).
In an epistemic setting, accident is read ‘unknown truths’, which is an important
notion in philosophy and formal epistemology. For example, it is a source of Fitch’s
‘paradox of knowability’ [10]. As another example, it is an important kind of Moore
sentences, which is in turn essential to Moore’s paradox [14,20]. In the terminology of
dynamic epistemic logic, such a Moore sentence is unsuccessful and self-refuting [15,
26, 28].
To distinguish ‘accident’ from ‘contingency’, a minimal logic of accident is provided
in [18]. This axiomatization is then simplified and its various extensions are proposed
in [22], which views the work on the logic of accident as a variation and continuation
of the work done on contingency logic. Independently of the literature on the logic
of accident, [23] provides a topological semantics for a logic of unknown truths and
shows its completeness over the class of S4 models. As for a comprehensive treatment
of accident logic, see [12].
The meanings of contingency and accident are so close that people mix the two
notions from time to time in everyday discourse and academic research. For instance,
Leibniz used the term ‘contingency’ to mean what is essentially meant by ‘accident’
(e.g. [1, 13]). For another example, in Chinese, the same character has been used to
express both notions. Besides, the relationship between the two notions is not clear
from the literature. The interactions between contingency and accident may sharpen
our understanding of these two concepts. Thus it is necessary to study them in a unified
framework.
Despite so many separate investigations on the notions of contingency and of ac-
cident in the literature, there has been no logical research on them together. As one
can imagine, once we study the two notions at once, the situation may become quite
involved. For instance, one difficulty in axiomatizing the logic with contingency and
accident as sole primitive modalities, is that we have only one accessibility relation
to handle two modal operators uniformly, which makes it nontrivial to find desired
interactive axioms of the two notions.
1In a recent paper [9], Fine shows that, in the context of S4 or KD4, knowledge of second order ignorance
is impossible, in which ‘ignorance’ means ‘ignorance whether’.
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Beyond axiomatizing the logic of contingency and accident over various classes of
frames, we also consider the dynamic extension, where contingency and accident oper-
ators are better understood as their epistemic counterparts, i.e. ‘ignorance (or equival-
ently, not knowing whether)’ and ‘unknown truth’, respectively. By applying the usual
reduction method, we obtain a complete axiomatization for the dynamic extension of
contingency and accident logic.
Our contributions consist of the following:
1. A schema NAD saying that necessity is almost definable in terms of ∆ and ◦
(Sec. 2)
2. The logic L(∇, •) of contingency and accident is less expressive than standard
modal logic over non-reflexivemodel classes, but equally expressive over reflex-
ive model classes (Sec. 3)
3. Transitivity is definable in L(∇, •) with a complex formula (Sec. 4)
4. Seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity, convergency are all undefinable in L(∇, •) by
means of a notion of ‘mirror reduction’ (Sec. 4)
5. A minimal axiomatization of L(∇, •), which also axiomatizes the class of serial
frames (Sec. 5, Sec. 6.1)
6. An axiomatization of L(∇, •) over transitive frames (Sec. 6.2)
7. An axiomatization of L(∇, •) over reflexive frames (Sec. 6.3)
8. A dynamic extension and one of its applications (Sec. 7)
2 Syntax and semantics
Let P be a fixed nonempty set of propositional variables. For the sake of presentation,
we introduce a large language, which includes not only contingency operator ∇ and
accident operator •, but also possibility operator ♦. But our main focus is the language
with only∇ and • as primitive modalities.
Definition 1. The language L(∇, •,♦) is generated by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p ∈ P | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∇ϕ | •ϕ | ♦ϕ
By disregarding the construct ♦ϕ, we obtain the language L(∇, •) of contingency and
accident logic; by further disregarding the construct •ϕ (resp. ∇ϕ), we obtain the
language L(∇) of contingency logic (resp. L(•) of accidental logic); by disregarding
the constructs∇ϕ and •ϕ, we obtain the language L(♦) of standard modal logic.
Intuitively, ∇ϕ means “it is contingent that ϕ”, •ϕ means “it is accident that ϕ”,
and ♦ϕ means “it is possible that ϕ”. Other connectives and operators are defined as
usual; in particular,∆ϕ, ◦ϕ, ϕ abbreviate ¬∇ϕ, ¬ • ϕ and ¬♦¬ϕ, respectively, read
as “it is non-contingent that ϕ”, “it is essential that ϕ”, “it is necessary that ϕ”.
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L(∇, •,♦) is interpreted over Kripke structures. A (Kripke) model for L(∇, •,♦)
is a tripleM = 〈S,R, V 〉, where S is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R is a binary
relation over S, called ‘accessibility relation’, and V is a valuation map from P to
P(S).
Definition 2. Given a modelM = 〈S,R, V 〉 and s ∈ S, the semantics of L(∇, •,♦)
is defined inductively in the following.
M, s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  ∇ϕ ⇐⇒ there are t, u ∈ S such that sRt, sRu andM, t  ϕ,M, u 2 ϕ
M, s  •ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ and there exists t ∈ S such that sRt andM, t 2 ϕ
M, s  ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ there are t ∈ S such that sRt and t  ϕ
One may easily compute the semantics of the defined modalities as follows:
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ for any t, u ∈ S such that sRt, sRu, we have (M, t  ϕ ⇐⇒ M, u  ϕ)
M, s  ◦ϕ ⇐⇒ ifM, s  ϕ then for any t ∈ S such that sRt, we haveM, t  ϕ
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ for any t ∈ S such that sRt we haveM, t  ϕ
Fact 3. The following results are immediate by the semantics:
(i)  ∇ϕ↔ (♦ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ)
(ii)  •ϕ↔ (ϕ ∧ ♦¬ϕ)
As shown above,∇ and • are both definable in terms of ♦, thus L(♦) is at least as
expressive as L(∇, •).
The following two formulas characterize the relationship between notions of con-
tingency and accident. Intuitively, (1) says that if something is contingent, then either
it or its negation is accident, (2) says that if it is accident that something implies any-
thing, and it is also accident that its negation implies anything, then it is contingent. In
fact, as we will see in Sec. 5, the two formulas constitute the desired ‘bridge axioms’
in the minimal axiomatization of L(∇, •).
Proposition 4.
(1)  ∇ϕ→ •ϕ ∨ •¬ϕ
(2)  •(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ •(¬ϕ→ χ)→ ∇ϕ
On one hand, we can see the similarity between contingent and accident: if we
replace • with ∇, then the resulted formulas are also valid, since we have  ∇ϕ ↔
∇¬ϕ and  ∇(ϕ → ψ) ∧ ∇(¬ϕ → χ) → ∇ϕ.2 On the other hand, we can also see
the difference between the two notions: if we replace∇ in (2) with •, then the obtained
formula •(ϕ→ ψ)∧ •(¬ϕ→ χ)→ •ϕ is invalid, as one may easily verify, though its
weaker version •(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ •(¬ϕ→ χ)→ •ϕ ∨ •¬ϕ is indeed valid.
2For the latter, consider its equivalence ∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ→ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ→ χ).
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By way of concluding this section, we propose a crucial schema. Recall that a
so-called ‘almost definability’ schema AD is proposed in [7, 8], i.e. ∇ψ → (ϕ ↔
∆ϕ∧∆(ψ → ϕ)), stating that necessity is almost definable in terms of∆, which helps
find the desired canonical relation in the completeness proof in the cited papers. Since
now we need also deal with the clause •ϕ, the schema AD is not enough. We thus need
a new schema that combines ∇ and •, if any. Fortunately, we find out the following
desired schema, dubbed ‘NAD’, which stands for “Necessity is Almost Definable in
terms of∆ and ◦”, to distinguish it from the schema AD. Note that there would appear
to be no reason to obtain NAD from AD.
•ψ → (ϕ↔ ∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ → ϕ)) (NAD)
Proposition 5. (NAD) is a validity in L(∇, •).
Proof. LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a model and s ∈ S. Suppose thatM, s  •ψ, to show
M, s  ϕ↔ ∆ϕ∧◦(¬ψ → ϕ). It should be clear thatM, s  ϕ→ ∆ϕ∧◦(¬ψ →
ϕ). It suffices to show thatM, s  ∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ.
For this, assume thatM, s  ∆ϕ∧◦(¬ψ → ϕ). By supposition, we haveM, s  ψ
andM, t  ¬ψ for some t with sRt. ThenM, s  ¬ψ → ϕ, which combining with
M, s  ◦(¬ψ → ϕ) and sRt gives us M, t  ¬ψ → ϕ. Thus M, t  ϕ. Since
s  ∆ϕ, it follows that for all u such that sRt, we have u  ϕ, namelyM, s  ϕ.
This schemawill guide us to define a suitable canonical relation in the completeness
proofs below.
3 Expressivity results
L(∇, •) is more expressive than both L(∇) and L(•) on the class of K-models, B-
models, 4-models, 5-models (since L(∇) and L(•) are incomparable on these model
classes [5, Sec. 3.2]), but equally expressive as both logics on the class of T -models
(since L(∇) and L(•) are equally expressive on the model class [5, Sec. 3.3]). In the
sequel, we compare the expressive powers of L(∇, •) and L(♦). As shown in Fact 3,
L(♦) is at least as expressive as L(∇, •) on any class of models.
Proposition 6. L(∇, •) is less expressive than L(♦) on the class of K-models, B-
models, 4-models, 5-models, but equally expressive as L(♦) on the class of T -models.
Proof. As for the strictness part, consider the followingK- (and also B-, 4-, 5-) models:
M s : p

M′ s′ : p
It is straightforward to prove that L(∇, •) formulas cannot distinguish (M, s) and
(M′, s′), but L(♦) can, sinceM, s  ♦⊤ whereasM′, s′ 2 ♦⊤.
Proposition 7. L(∇, •) is less expressive than L(♦) on the class of D-models.
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Proof. Consider the following pointed models (M, s) and (N , s′), which can be dis-
tinguished by an L()-formulap:
M : s : p // t : ¬p

oo N : s′ : p // t′ : ¬poo
Note that M and N are both serial. However, (M, s) and (N , s′) cannot be dis-
tinguished by any L(∇, •)-formulas. To show this, we proceed with induction on
ϕ ∈ L(∇, •). The nontrivial cases consist of ∇ϕ and •ϕ. For the case ∇ϕ, note
that both s and s′ have a sole successor, which impliesM, s 2 ∇ϕ and N , s′ 2 ∇ϕ,
and thusM, s  ∇ϕ iffN , s′  ∇ϕ.
For the case •ϕ, we show by simultaneous induction a stronger result: for all ϕ, (i)
M, s  ϕ iffN , s′  ϕ, and (ii)M, t  ϕ iffN , t′  ϕ.
For (i), we have the following equivalences:
M, s  •ϕ ⇐⇒ s  ϕ and t 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ and t 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ s′  ϕ and t′ 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ N , s′  •ϕ,
where the second equivalence followed from the induction hypothesis for (i), and the
third equivalence is obtained by (ii).
M, t  •ϕ ⇐⇒ t  ϕ and (s 2 ϕ or t 2 ϕ)
⇐⇒ t  ϕ and s 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ t′  ϕ and s 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ t′  ϕ and s′ 2 ϕ
⇐⇒ N , t′  •ϕ,
where the third equivalence followed from the induction hypothesis for (ii), and the
fourth equivalence is obtained by (i).
We have thus completed the proof.
In summary, on the class of K- (and also D-, B-, 4-, 5-) models, the expressive
power of L(∇, •) is between L(∇) and L(♦), and also between L(•) and L(♦); on the
class of T -models, all logics in question are equally expressive.
4 Frame Definability
In the previous section we have seen that L(∇, •) is more expressive than both L(∇)
and L(•) (at the level of models), we may expect that the same situation holds at
the level of frames. Recall that many frame properties, in particular transitivity, are
undefinable in both sublanguages. Below we shall show that the property of transitivity
is definable with a complex formula in the combined language, therefore the new logic
is indeed more expressive at the level of frames.
Symmetry is definable in L(•) with •(p → •p) → p [6, Prop. 10], thus also
definable in the stronger logic L(∇, •).
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Proposition 8. The property of transitivity is defined by the following formula:
(Tr) • q ∧∆p ∧ ◦(¬q → p)→ ◦(¬q → ◦(¬r → p)).
Proof. Let a frame F = 〈S,R〉 be given.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that F is transitive but F 2 Tr. That is, there is a
model M based on F and a state s ∈ S such that M, s  •q ∧ ∆p ∧ ◦(¬q → p)
but s 2 ◦(¬q → ◦(¬r → p)). It follows from the latter that there exists t such that
sRt and t  ¬q and t 2 ◦(¬r → p), which implies that there is a u such that tRu
and u  ¬r ∧ ¬p. By the transitivity of R, we have sRu. Moreover, since s  •q, it
follows that s  q and there exists t′ such that sRt′ and t′  ¬q. From s  q we obtain
s  ¬q → p, then by s  ◦(¬q → p) and sRt′, we can show that t′  ¬q → p, and
thus t′  p. Now there are two successors t′ and u of s which have difference truth
values for p, hence s 2 ∆p, which contradicts with the supposition s  ∆p.
Assume that F is not transitive, i.e., there are s, t, u ∈ S such that sRt, tRu, but
not sRu. Clearly, s 6= t and t 6= u. Define a valuation V on F as follows:
V (p) = V (r) = S\{u}, V (q) = {s}.
We will show 〈F , V 〉, s 2 Tr, which implies F 2 Tr.
• s  •q: since s 6= t and V (q) = {s}, thus t 2 q. We have also s  q and sRt,
thus s  •q.
• s  ∆p: this is because for all w such that sRw, w 6= u, thus by the definition
of V (p), w  p.
• s  ◦(¬q → p): we have shown in the second item that for all w such that sRw,
w  p, thus w  ¬q → p.
• s 2 ◦(¬q → ◦(¬r → p)): since t 6= u, by the definition of V (p), we obtain
t  p, thus t  ¬r → p; moreover, by the definition of V (p) and V (r), we
infer u 2 ¬r → p, thus t 2 ◦(¬r → p) since tRu. We have also t  ¬q, thus
t 2 ¬q → ◦(¬r → p). Furthermore, s  q, thus s  ¬q → ◦(¬r → p), then we
conclude that s 2 ◦(¬q → ◦(¬r → p)) due to sRt.
In the remainder of this section, we show that none of the properties of seriality, re-
flexivity, Euclideanity and convergency is definable in L(∇, •). For this, we introduce
a notion of ‘mirror reduction’3. Intuitively, the mirror reduction of a frame is obtained
by deleting all arrows from each x to its sole successor x. It is easy to see that every
frame has a sole mirror reduction.
Definition 9 (Mirror reduction). Let F = 〈S,R〉 be a frame. Frame F = 〈S,Rm〉 is
said to be the mirror reduction of F , if
Rm = R\{(x, x) | R(x) = {x}}.4
3This notion is different from the notion ‘mirror reduction’ in [18].
4An alternative definition of Rm is such that R\{(x, x) | R(x) = {x}} ⊆ Rm ⊆ R. In this case,
every frame may have many mirror reductions.
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Proposition 10. Let Fm = 〈S,Rm〉 be the mirror reduction of F = 〈S,R〉. Then for
all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), we have
Fm  ϕ ⇐⇒ F  ϕ.
Proof. We show a stronger result: for all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), for all s ∈ S and V on F , we
have 〈Fm, V 〉, s  ϕ iff 〈F , V 〉, s  ϕ.
We proceed with induction on ϕ. Boolean cases are straightforward. The only
nontrivial cases are ∇ϕ and •ϕ. In either case, the ‘only if’ direction is easy since
Rm ⊆ R.
As for the ‘if’ part, suppose 〈F , V 〉, s  ∇ϕ, then there exists t, u ∈ S such that
sRt and sRu and t  ϕ and u 2 ϕ. Obviously, R(s) 6= {s}. Thus sRmt and sRmu.
By induction hypothesis, we conclude that 〈Fm, V 〉, s  ∇ϕ.
Suppose 〈F , V 〉, s  •ϕ, then s  ϕ and there exists t ∈ S such that sRt and
t 2 ϕ. Obviously, s 6= t, and thus R(s) 6= {s}. Thus sRmt. By induction hypothesis,
we conclude that 〈Fm, V 〉, s  •ϕ.
Corollary 11. Seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity and convergency are all not definable
in L(∇, •).
Proof. Consider the following frames:
F1 : s1

Fm1 : s1
F2 : s2 // t2

Fm2 : s2 // t2
It is easy to see that Fm1 and F
m
2 are the mirror reductions of F1 and F2, respectively.
By Prop. 10, we have that for all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), Fm1  ϕ iff F1  ϕ, and F
m
2  ϕ iff
F2  ϕ. Now observer that F1 is reflexive and serial, but Fm1 is not. Thus reflexivity
and seriality are not definable in L(∇, •). Moreover, F2 is Euclidean and convergent,
but Fm2 is not. Thus Euclideanity and convergency are not definable in L(∇, •).
Note Our definition for mirror reduction amounts to a combination of ‘R-reduction’
in [16] and ‘mirror reduction’ in [18], since we need to deal with the cases •ϕ and∇ϕ
at the same time. It is noteworthy that our definition cannot be replaced by the two
notions in the cited papers, which will be explicated as follows.
We recall the ‘R-reduction’ in [16], where Rm is defined such that
R\{(x, y) | R(x) = {y}} ⊆ Rm ⊆ R,
i.e. Fm is obtained from F by leaving out the arrow from x to its sole successor y.
This definition cannot give us Prop. 10, for example,
F : s // t Fm s t
It is easy to see that Fm is a R-reduction of F . However, Fm  ◦p but F 2 ◦p.
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The notion of ‘mirror reduction’ in [18] is defined such that
R\{(x, x) | x ∈ S} ⊆ Rm ⊆ R,
i.e. Fm is obtained from F by leaving out some or all reflexive arrows. This definition
cannot give us Prop. 10 either. Take the following frames as an example.
F : s //

too

Fm s // too
Note that Fm is a mirror reduction in the sense of [18]. However, it is easy to see
that Fm  ∆p, but F 2 ∆p.
5 Minimal axiomatization
From now on, we axiomatize L(∇, •) over various frame classes. The minimal system
is described in the following definition.
Definition 12 (SystemK∇•). The minimal system of L(∇, •), denotedK∇•, includes
the following axiom schemas and is closed under the following inference rules.
A0 All instances of tautologies A1 •ϕ→ ϕ
A2 ∇ϕ↔ ∇¬ϕ A3 •(ψ → ϕ) ∧ ϕ→ •ϕ
A4 ∇(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ∇ϕ ∨ ∇ψ A5 •(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ •ϕ ∨ •ψ
A6 ∇ϕ→ •ϕ ∨ •¬ϕ A7 •(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ •(¬ϕ→ χ)→ ∇ϕ
R1
ϕ
∆ϕ
R2
ϕ
◦ϕ
R3
ϕ↔ ψ
∆ϕ↔ ∆ψ
R4
ϕ↔ ψ
◦ϕ↔ ◦ψ
MP
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
Intuitively, A1 says that accident is true; A2 says that contingency is closed under
negation, that is, something is contingent amounts to saying that its negation is contin-
gent; A3 says that something that is true and accidentally implied by anything is itself
accidental, of which one equivalence is ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦(ψ → ϕ); A4 (resp. A5) says that
if a conjunction is contingent (resp. accidental), then at least one conjunct is contingent
(resp. accidental). In what follows, we will use the more familiar equivalences of A4
and A5, respectively: ∆ϕ∧∆ψ → ∆(ϕ∧ψ) and ◦ϕ∧◦ψ → ◦(ϕ∧ψ). The intuitions
of A6 and A7 have been described before Prop. 4.
Recall that in the minimal axiomatization of L(∇), the axiom ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ →
ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ → χ) is indispensable. In contrast, in the minimal axiomatization of the
enlarged language L(∇, •), we do not need it any more, though it is provable in the
system, due to the completeness to be shown later.
Before introducing the canonical model, we need a bunch of facts and propositions.
Fact 13. ⊢ ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ∆ϕ.
Fact 14. For all k ∈ N, ⊢ ∆χ1 ∧ · · · ∧∆χk → ∆(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χk), and ⊢ ◦χ1 ∧ · · · ∧
◦χk → ◦(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χk).
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Proposition 15. For all n ≥ 1,
⊢ ∆(
n∧
k=1
χk → ϕ) ∧
n∧
k=1
∆χk ∧
n∧
k=1
◦(ϕ→ χk)→ ϕ ∨∆ϕ.
Proof. Let χ =
∧n
k=1 χk. We have the following proof sequences:
(i) ¬ϕ→ (ϕ→ χ) A0
(ii) ◦(ϕ→ χ) ∧ ¬ϕ→ ∆(ϕ→ χ) (i), A0, Fact 13
(iii) ∆(ϕ→ χ) ∧∆(χ ∧ ϕ)→ ∆ϕ A0, A2, A4, R3
(iv) ∆(χ→ ϕ) ∧∆χ→ ∆(χ ∧ ϕ) A4, A0, R3
(v) ∆(χ→ ϕ) ∧∆χ ∧ ◦(ϕ→ χ)→ ϕ ∨∆ϕ (ii)− (iv)
(vi)
∧n
k=1 ∆χk → ∆χ Fact 14
(vii)
∧n
k=1 ◦(ϕ→ χk)→ ◦(ϕ→ χ) Fact 14, A0, R4
(viii) ∆(χ→ ϕ) ∧
∧n
k=1 ∆χk ∧
∧n
k=1 ◦(ϕ→ χk)→ ϕ ∨∆ϕ (vi)− (viii)
Proposition 16. For all n ≥ 1,
⊢ ∆(
n∧
k=1
χk → ϕ) ∧
n∧
k=1
◦(¬ϕ→ χk) ∧ ϕ→ ∆ϕ.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
(i) ϕ→
∧n
k=1(¬ϕ→ χk) A0
(ii)
∧n
k=1 ◦(¬ϕ→ χk) ∧ ϕ→
∧n
k=1 ∆(¬ϕ→ χk) (i), A0, Fact 13
(iii)
∧n
k=1 ∆(¬ϕ→ χk)→ ∆(¬ϕ→
∧n
k=1 χk) A4, A0, R3
(iv) ∆(¬ϕ→
∧n
k=1 χk)↔ ∆(¬
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) A0, R3
(v) ∆(
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) ∧∆(¬
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ)→ ∆ϕ A4, A0, R3
(vi) ∆(
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) ∧
∧n
k=1 ◦(¬ϕ→ χk) ∧ ϕ→ ∆ϕ (ii)− (v)
Proposition 17. For all n ≥ 1,
⊢ ◦(
n∧
k=1
χk → ϕ) ∧
n∧
k=1
◦(¬ϕ→ χk)→ ◦ϕ.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
(i)
∧n
k=1 ◦(¬ϕ→ χk)→ ◦(¬
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) Fact 14, A0, R4
(ii) ◦(
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) ∧ ◦(¬
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ)→ ◦ϕ A5, A0, R4
(iii) ◦(
∧n
k=1 χk → ϕ) ∧
∧n
k=1 ◦(¬ϕ→ χk)→ ◦ϕ (i), (ii)
We are now in a position to define the desired canonical model. The following
definition is inspired by the schema NAD.
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Definition 18 (Canonical Model). Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, Vc〉 is the canonical model ofK∇•,
if
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal consistent set for K∇•},
• sRct iff there exists ψ such that (a) •ψ ∈ s, and (b) for all ϕ, if ∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ →
ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t,
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
Lemma 19 (Truth Lemma). For all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), for all s ∈ Sc, we have
Mc, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial cases are∇ϕ and •ϕ.
• Case ∇ϕ.
‘⇐=’: suppose that∇ϕ ∈ s, by IH, it suffices to find two successors t1, t2 in Sc
of s such that ϕ ∈ t1 and ¬ϕ ∈ t2. By supposition and axiom A6, •ϕ∨•¬ϕ ∈ s,
then •ϕ ∈ s or •¬ϕ ∈ s. We consider only the first case, i.e. •ϕ ∈ s (thus
ϕ ∈ s by A1), since the second case is similar. In the first case, we show that
{χ | ∆χ ∧ ◦(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s} ∪ {ϕ} and {χ | ∆χ ∧ ◦(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ}
are both consistent. We denote the two sets Γ1,Γ2, respectively.
If Γ1 is inconsistent, then there are χ1, · · · , χn such that ⊢ χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn →
¬ϕ, and ∆χk ∧ ◦(¬ϕ → χk) ∈ s for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. By R1, we obtain
∆(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn → ¬ϕ) ∈ s. Since we have also ϕ ∈ s, Prop. 15 implies
that ∆ϕ ∈ s, contradicting the supposition. Similarly, applying Prop. 16 we can
show that Γ2 is consistent.
‘=⇒’: assume, for a contradiction, that Mc, s  ∇ϕ but ∇ϕ /∈ s (namely
∆ϕ ∈ s). By assumption, there exist t, u ∈ Sc such that sRct, sRcu and ϕ ∈ t,
ϕ /∈ u. From sRct it follows that there exists ψ such that •ψ ∈ s and, for all α,
if ∆α ∧ ◦(¬ψ → α) ∈ s, then α ∈ t. Since ¬ϕ /∈ t and ∆¬ϕ ∈ s, we obtain
that ◦(¬ψ → ¬ϕ) /∈ s, i.e. •(ϕ→ ψ) ∈ s. Similarly, from sRcu it follows that
there exists χ such that •(¬ϕ → χ) ∈ s. Then by axiom A7, we conclude that
∇ϕ ∈ s: a contradiction.
• Case •ϕ.
‘⇐=’: suppose that •ϕ ∈ s, then by Axiom A1, ϕ ∈ s. By IH, we only need
to find a t ∈ Sc with sRct and ¬ϕ ∈ t. For this, it suffice to show that {χ |
∆χ ∧ ◦(¬ϕ→ χ) ∈ s} ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
If not, then there are χ1, · · · , χm such that ⊢ χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm → ϕ, and ∆χj ∧
◦(¬ϕ → χj) ∈ s for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. By R2, ⊢ ◦(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm → ϕ). Then
using Prop. 17, we infer ◦ϕ ∈ s, contrary to the supposition, as desired.
‘=⇒’: assume, for a contradiction, thatMc, s  •ϕ but •ϕ /∈ s (i.e. ◦ϕ ∈ s).
Then by IH, ϕ ∈ s and there is a t ∈ Sc such that sRct and ϕ 6∈ t. From sRct
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it follows that there exists χ such that •χ ∈ s and, for all β, if ∆β ∧ ◦(¬χ →
β) ∈ s, then β ∈ t. Since ϕ /∈ t, then ∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬χ → ϕ) /∈ s. However, from
◦ϕ ∈ s and ϕ ∈ s, we obtain∆ϕ ∈ s by Fact 13 and ◦(¬χ→ ϕ) ∈ s by axiom
A3, which is a contradiction.
Now it is a routine exercise to obtain the following.
Theorem 20. K∇• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all
frames.
6 Extensions
6.1 Serial system
We will show that K∇• also axiomatize the class of serial frames. This result cannot
follow from the truth lemma directly, since the canonical relation Rc in Def. 18 is
not necessarily serial. This is indeed the case when all formulas of the form ◦ψ are
included in the states inMc, so that these states have no Rc-successors. We call such
states ‘dead ends w.r.t. Rc’. So we need to transformMc into a serial model, whereas
the truth value of each formula at each state is preserved. For this, we follow the
strategy called ‘reflexivizing the dead ends’ introduced in [16, p. 226] and [8, p. 89].
Theorem 21. K∇• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of serial
frames.
Proof. Define Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, Vc〉 as in Def. 18, and construct a model MDc =
〈Sc, RDc , Vc〉 such that R
D
c = Rc ∪ {(s, s) | s is a dead end w.r.t. Rc inMc}. Now
MDc is serial.
The remainder is to show that the satisfiability of formulas in L(∇, •) is invariant
under the tranformation. That is to show, for all ϕ ∈ L(∇, •), for all s ∈ Sc,Mc, s 
ϕ iff MDc , s  ϕ. We need only consider the cases for ∇ϕ and •ϕ. If s is not a
dead end w.r.t. Rc, then the claim is obvious; otherwise, we have Mc, s 2 ∇ϕ and
MDc , s 2 ∇ϕ, and alsoMc, s 2 •ϕ andM
D
c , s 2 •ϕ.
6.2 Transitive system
We now consider the proof system of L(∇, •) over transitive frames, which extends
K
∇• with the following axiom schemas. We denote the systemK4∇•.
A4-1 ∆ϕ→ ∆∆ϕ
A4-2 ∆ϕ→ ◦(ψ → ∆ϕ)
A4-3 •ψ1 ∧∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ)→ ∆ ◦ (¬ψ2 → ϕ)
A4-4 •ψ1 ∧∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ)→ ◦(¬ψ1 → ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ))
Proposition 22. K4∇• is sound with respect to the class of transitive frames.
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Proof. By the soundness of K∇•, we only need to show the validity of four extra
axiom schemas. Moreover, A4-4 defines transitivity (Prop. 8). By way of illustration,
we prove the validity of axiom A4-3.
LetM = 〈S,R, V 〉 be a transitive model and s ∈ S. Assume towards contradiction
thatM, s  •ψ1∧∆ϕ∧◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ) butM, s 2 ∆◦ (¬ψ2 → ϕ). Then there are t, u
such that sRt, sRu and t  ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ) and u 2 ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ), and then there is an x
with uRx and x  ¬ψ2 ∧ ¬ϕ. Since s  •ψ1, it follows that s  ψ1 and y  ¬ψ1 for
some y with sRy, thus s  ¬ψ1 → ϕ. Combining this andM, s  ◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ), we
have: all R-successors of s satisfy ¬ψ1 → ϕ, in particular y  ¬ψ1 → ϕ, and hence
y  ϕ. From sRu and uRx and the transitivity of R, we have sRx. But x 2 ϕ, thus
we can obtain s 2 ∆ϕ, contrary to the assumption.
Theorem 23. K4∇• is strongly complete with respect to the class of transitive frames.
Proof. It suffices to show that Rc is transitive. Suppose sRct and tRcu. Then there
exists ψ1 such that
(1) •ψ1 ∈ s and
(2) for each ϕ, if∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t.
Moreover, there is a ψ2 such that
(3) •ψ2 ∈ t and
(4) for each ϕ, if∆ϕ ∧ ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ) ∈ t, then ϕ ∈ u.
Assume towards a contradiction that sRcu fails. Then by (1), there must exist ϕ
′
such that (5) ∆ϕ′ ∧ ◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ′) ∈ s, but ϕ′ /∈ u. The remainder is to show that
∆ϕ′ ∧ ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ′) ∈ t, since then using (4), we can arrive at a contradiction.
Since ∆ϕ′ ∈ s, from axiom A4-1, it follows that ∆∆ϕ′ ∈ s; also, from axiom
A4-2, it follows that ◦(¬ψ1 → ∆ϕ′) ∈ s. Then using (2), we infer∆ϕ′ ∈ t.
Due to (1) and (5), since ⊢ •ψ1 ∧∆ϕ′ ∧◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ′)→ ∆ ◦ (¬ψ2 → ϕ′) (axiom
A4-3), we have∆◦ (¬ψ2 → ϕ′) ∈ s; since ⊢ •ψ1∧∆ϕ′∧◦(¬ψ1 → ϕ′)→ ◦(¬ψ1 →
◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ′)) ∈ s (Axiom A4-4), we get ◦(¬ψ1 → ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ′)) ∈ s. Then using
(2) again, we conclude that ◦(¬ψ2 → ϕ
′) ∈ t, as desired.
We conclude this subsection with a proposition and two conjectures.
Proposition 24. ⊢ ∆ϕ→ ∆∆ϕ ∧∆ ◦ ϕ ∧ ◦∆ϕ ∧ ◦ ◦ ϕ.
Conjecture 25. ⊢ ∆ϕ→ ◦n∆m◦l∆kϕ for all n,m, l, k ∈ N such that n+m+l+k ≥
2.
Conjecture 26. ⊢ ∆ϕ → ∆m♥ϕ for all m ∈ N such that m ≥ 1, where ♥ is any
combinations of∆,∇, •, ◦,¬.
6.3 Reflexive system
The proof system of L(∇, •) over reflexive frames, denoted T∇•, is an extension of
K
∇• with an extra axiom schema AT:
∆ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦(ψ → ϕ).
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Let us start with the soundness of T∇•. By the soundness of K∇•, we need only
show the validity of AT.
Proposition 27. ∆ϕ ∧ ϕ→ ◦(ψ → ϕ) is valid over the class of reflexive frames.
Proof. Given any reflexive modelM = 〈S,R, V 〉 and any state s ∈ S, suppose, for a
contradiction, thatM, s  ∆ϕ ∧ ϕ butM, s 2 ◦(ψ → ϕ). From the latter, it follows
that there exists t such that sRt and t  ψ ∧¬ϕ. By the reflexivity of R, we have sRs.
Then by the first supposition and sRt, we infer that t  ϕ: a contradiction.
As observed above,Rc is not necessarily serial, thus is not necessarily reflexive. To
fix this problem so as to gain the completeness, we need to use the reflexive closure of
Rc.
Definition 28 (The canonical model for T∇•). Model MTc = 〈Sc, R
T
c , Vc〉 is the
canonical model of T∇•, if Sc and V c is as previous, and RTc is the reflexive closure
of Rc; in symbol, R
T
c = Rc ∪ {(s, s) | s ∈ S
c}.
It is clear thatMT is reflexive. Moreover, the truth lemma holds forMT .
Lemma 29. For each ϕ ∈ L(∇, •) and for each s ∈ Sc,
MTc , s  ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. We need only check the cases∇ϕ and •ϕ.
• Case ∇ϕ: Suppose, for a contradiction, that MTc , s  ∇ϕ but ∇ϕ /∈ s (i.e.
∆ϕ ∈ s). Then by induction hypothesis, there are t, u ∈ Sc such that sRTc t and
sRTc u and ϕ ∈ t and ϕ /∈ u. It is obvious that t 6= u. According to the definition
of RT , we consider the following cases.
– s 6= t and s 6= u. Then sRct and sRcu. In this case, the proof goes as the
corresponding part in Lemma 19, and we can arrive at a contradiction.
– s = t or s = u. W.l.o.g. we may assume that s = t, and thus s 6= u, which
implies that ϕ ∈ s and sRcu. Then there exists ψ such that •ψ ∈ s, and for
every χ, if ∆χ ∧ ◦(¬ψ → χ) ∈ s, then χ ∈ u. Since ∆ϕ ∈ s and ϕ /∈ u,
we obtain ◦(¬ψ → ϕ) /∈ s. However, from ∆ϕ ∈ s again and ϕ ∈ s and
axiom AT, it follows that ◦(¬ψ → ϕ) ∈ s: a contradiction.
The other way around is immediate from the corresponding part in Lemma 19
and Rc ⊆ RTc .
• Case •ϕ. Suppose, for a contradiction, thatMT , s  •ϕ but •ϕ /∈ s. Then by
induction hypothesis, ϕ ∈ s and there is a t ∈ Sc such that sRTc t and ϕ /∈ t.
Obviously, s 6= t, thus sRct. Then the proof continues as the corresponding
part in Lemma 19, and it will lead to a contradiction. The other way around is
immediate from the corresponding part in Lemma 19 and Rc ⊆ RTc .
It follows immediately that
Theorem 30. T∇• is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of reflexive
frames.
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7 Adding dynamic operators
This section generalizes the logic of contingency and accident to the simplest case of
the dynamic operator: public announcements. We propose a complete axiomatization
for the extended logic, and apply the system to analyse the successful and self-refuting
formulas. Our results can be easily extended to the most general case of action models.
It is noteworthy that the dynamic considerations in the accident logic is missing in the
literature.
7.1 Axiomatization with announcements
The language of contingency and accident logic with public announcement, denoted
L(∇, •, [·]), is obtained from L(∇, •) by adding public announcement operators.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∇ϕ | •ϕ | [ϕ]ϕ.
Intuitively, [ψ]ϕ is read ‘after each truthfully public announcement of ψ, it is the case
that ϕ’.
Semantically, the public announcement of ψ is evaluated via eliminating all states
where ψ does not hold.
M, s  [ψ]ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s  ψ impliesM|ψ, s  ϕ.
WhereM|ψ is the model restriction ofM to the ψ-states.
The common reduction axioms in propositional logic with public announcements
consist of:
AP [ψ]p↔ (ψ → p)
AN [ψ]¬ϕ↔ (ψ → ¬[ψ]ϕ)
AC [ψ](ϕ ∧ χ)↔ ([ψ]ϕ ∧ [ψ]χ)
AA [ψ][χ]ϕ↔ [ψ ∧ [ψ]χ]ϕ
For the logic L(∇, •, [·]), we observe the following key axiom schemas:
A∇ [ψ]∇ϕ↔ (ψ → ∇[ψ]ϕ ∧∇[ψ]¬ϕ)
A• [ψ] • ϕ↔ (ψ → •[ψ]ϕ)
Collecting all reduction axioms into the system K∇•, we obtain a proof system
K
∇•[·]. We also use K•[·] for the subsystem without the axioms involving ∇, and
K
∇[·] for the subsystem without the axioms involving •.
One may compute the following:
[ψ]∆ϕ↔ (ψ → ∆[ψ]ϕ ∨∆[ψ]¬ϕ)
[ψ] ◦ ϕ↔ (ψ → ◦[ψ]ϕ)
Theorem 31. K∇•[·] is sound and complete with respect to the class of all frames.
Proof. The soundness ofK∇[·] is given in [8, Prop. 7.4]. It suffices to show the validity
of axiom A•. Let (M, s) be an arbitrary pointed model, whereM = 〈S,R, V 〉.
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Firstly, suppose that M, s  [ψ] • ϕ and M, s  ψ, to show M, s  •[ψ]ϕ. By
supposition,M|ψ, s  •ϕ. This means thatM|ψ, s  ϕ and there exists t ∈M|ψ such
that sRt andM|ψ, t 2 ϕ. ThenM, s  [ψ]ϕ, and moreover, there exists t ∈ S such
that sRt such thatM, t  ψ andM|ψ, t 2 ϕ, which entailsM, t 2 [ψ]ϕ. Therefore,
M, s  •[ψ]ϕ.
Conversely, assume that M, s  ψ → •[ψ]ϕ and M, s  ψ (i.e. s ∈ M|ψ), to
showM|ψ, s  •ϕ. By assumption,M, s  •[ψ]ϕ. ThenM, s  [ψ]ϕ and there is
a t with sRt such that M, t 2 [ψ]ϕ. From M, s  ψ and M, s  [ψ]ϕ, it follows
that M|ψ, s  ϕ; from M, t 2 [ψ]ϕ, it follows that M, t  ψ (i.e. t ∈ M|ψ) and
M|ψ, t 2 ϕ. We have thus shown thatM|ψ, s  ϕ and there exists t ∈ M|ψ such that
sRt andM|ψ, t 2 ϕ. Therefore,M|ψ, s  •ϕ.
The completeness of K∇•[·] reduces to that of K∇•, using the usual reduction
method.
7.2 Application: Successful and self-refuting formulas
To say a formula ϕ is successful, if it still holds after being announced, in symbol
 [ϕ]ϕ. Otherwise, we say this formula is unsuccessful. Moreover, to say a formula is
self-refuting, if its negation always holds after being announced, in symbol  [ϕ]¬ϕ.
In this part, we will show, by syntactic methods, that Moore sentences are not only
unsuccessful, but self-refuting, whereas their negations are all successful.
It has already been shown that Moore sentences are unsuccessful and self-refuting,
but the proof perspectives are always semantics, that is, 2 [•p] • p and  [•p]¬ • p, see
e.g. [15, 25, 28]. With the reduction axioms in hand, one may give a proof-theoretical
perspective, in a relatively easy way.
Proposition 32. [•p]¬ • p is provable inK•[·].
Proof. We just need to see the following proof sequences:
[•p]¬ • p ↔ (•p→ ¬[•p] • p) AN
↔ (•p→ ¬(•p→ •[•p]p)) A•
↔ (•p→ ¬(•p→ •(•p→ p))) AP
↔ (•p→ •p ∧ ¬ • (•p→ p)) A0
↔ (•p→ ¬ • (•p→ p)) A0
Moreover, •p→ ¬ • (•p → p) is provable in K•[·]. This is because by axiom A1,
⊢ •p→ p, then applying R2 and Def. ◦, we obtain that ⊢ ¬ • (•p→ p).
On the other hand, unlike Moore sentences, their negations are all successful for-
mulas.
Proposition 33. [¬ • p]¬ • p is provable in K•[·].
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Proof. We observe the following proof sequences:
[¬ • p]¬ • p ↔ (¬ • p→ ¬[¬ • p] • p) AN
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬(¬ • p→ •[¬ • p]p)) A•
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬(¬ • p→ •(¬ • p→ p))) AP
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬ • p ∧ ¬ • (¬ • p→ p)) A0
↔ (¬ • p→ ¬ • (¬ • p→ p)) A0
↔ (•(¬ • p→ p)→ •p) A0
The right-hand side of the last equivalence is provable in K•[·], as follows. By
axiom A3, we have ⊢ •(¬ • p→ p)∧ p→ •p. Moreover, ⊢ •(¬ • p→ p)∧¬p→ •p,
as ⊢ •(¬ • p→ p)→ (¬ • p→ p) (by axiom A1) and ⊢ ¬p ∧ (¬ • p→ p)→ •p (by
axiom A0). Therefore, ⊢ •(¬ • p→ p)→ •p.
If we define an operator [?ψ], called ‘announcement whether ψ’ in [27], such that
[?ψ]ϕ ↔ [ψ]ϕ ∧ [¬ψ]ϕ, then by Props. 32 and 33, we have that [? • p]¬ • p is prov-
able, which says that whenever announcing whether p is an unknown truth, p is not an
unknown truth any more.
8 Concluding words
In this paper, we proposed a logic L(∇, •) of contingency and accident, which com-
bines the notions of contingency and accident together. We compared the relative ex-
pressive powers of this logic and other related logics. We proved that the property of
transitivity is definable in terms of a complex formula involving both contingency oper-
ator and accident operator, while seriality, reflexivity, Euclideanity and convergency are
all undefinable in L(∇, •), by introducing a notion of ‘mirror reduction’; in contrast,
the undefinability results cannot be solved using notions of ‘R-reduction’ and ‘mirror
reduction’ in the literature. With the help of a schema, we gave complete axiomatiz-
ations of L(∇, •) over K-frames, D-frames, 4-frames, T -frames. We also investigate
a dynamic extension of L(∇, •) and present a complete axiomatization for this logic,
which can be applied to prove syntactically that Moore sentences are self-refuting and
negations of Moore sentences are successful.
There are a lot of work to be continued, such as axiomatizations of L(∇, •) over
symmetric frames and over Euclidean frames, the suitable notion of bisimulation for
L(∇, •) and corresponding van Benthem characterization theorem.
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